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Abstract
We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with 2 countries, horizontal and vertical
multinational activity and endogenous domestic and foreign investment. It is found that
horizontal multinational activity always leads to a complementary relationship between
domestic and foreign investment. Vertical multinational activity, in contrast, leads to
either a substitutional or complementary relationship between domestic and foreign in-
vestment, depending on the firms’ technologies. We test the theoretical implications with
a panel of U.S. multinationals and find empirical support.
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1 Introduction
Rising multinational activity in the recent past has raised important questions about how
multinational activity affects domestic capital formation. While Feldstein (1995) finds a
negative correlation between foreign direct investment (FDI) and domestic investment for
OECD countries, Desai et al. (2005a) find a positive correlation for the U.S. These conflicting
results indicate that neither an optimistic nor a pessimistic view on the domestic consequences
of FDI might capture the full story.
Intuitively, a distinction between the motives for FDI is crucial for understanding the
relation between domestic and foreign capital expenditures. While horizontal multinationals
invest abroad in order to serve new markets, vertical multinationals invest abroad in order
to reduce their production costs. Therefore, the aggregate finding of foreign and domestic
capital expenditures being substitutes or complements may be rather distinct for either of
the two types of multinationals.
Our paper intends to contribute to the debate by building a general equilibrium model,
which extends Markusen’s (2002) Knowledge–Capital model of the multinational firm by
endogenous domestic and foreign capital expenditures. Since the Knowledge–Capital model
explains the emergence of both horizontal and vertical multinational firms, we can analyze the
relation between domestic and foreign capital expenditures under different motives for FDI.
Afterwards, we test the theoretical implications with U.S. data on the operations of multina-
tional firms. Our theoretical and empirical results show that the link between domestic and
foreign capital expenditures crucially differs between horizontal and vertical FDI.
Our paper is therefore in line with other recent research on the domestic consequences
of FDI. Braunerhjelm et al. (2005) and Arndt et al. (2007) also consider that the motives
for FDI matter for the relationship between domestic and foreign capital expenditures. In
contrast to them, we derive our hypotheses from a general equilibrium model with endogenous
capital expenditures and we bring our hypotheses directly to the data.
The empirical literature on the link between domestic and foreign investment has started
with Feldstein (1995) who found a negative correlation between FDI and domestic investment
in a sample of OECD countries, suggesting that outward FDI reduces domestic investment.
More recently, Desai et al. (2005a) redid his analysis on a subsample of domestic investment
and FDI by examining domestic and foreign capital expenditures of U.S. multinationals.
Instead of a negative relation between domestic and foreign capital expenditures, they find
a positive and significant link between the two variables. One possible explanation they
put forward is that the USA may be different from other OECD countries. Herzer and
Schrooten (2008) provide some evidence for this explanation since they find substitutability
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between domestic and foreign investment for German data while they find complementary
for U.S. data. A second explanation Desai et al. (2005a) put forward relates to the activities
of multinational firms which are different from the activities of the average firm. A third
explanation relates to the composition of FDI and domestic investment in both samples in
the sense that aggregate FDI data contain financing flows whereas the data for multinationals
are restricted to capital expenditures. In a pooled panel of U.S. multinationals with more
than 2,000 observations and period fixed effects, Desai et al. (2005b) find that a 10% increase
in foreign investment increases domestic investments by approximately 2%, confirming the
aggregate results.
Our theoretical results show that horizontal multinational activity leads to a complemen-
tary relationship between domestic and foreign FDI, irrespective of the firms’ technologies.
Vertical multinational activity, in contrast, leads to a substitutional relationship between
domestic and foreign investment if (i) the factor shares of the firm’s domestic and foreign
intermediate goods differ sufficiently or if (ii) domestic and foreign intermediate goods have
sufficiently different shares in the firm’s final good.
We test the implications of our theoretical model in an econometric analysis using a U.S.
panel of foreign and domestic investments at the sector level over the period 1999–2005. In
order to test the implications from the theoretical model, we test whether the link between
domestic and foreign investment is different for horizontal and vertical multinationals.
If we do not distinguish between horizontal and vertical FDI, the results of our panel with
random and fixed sector effects confirm the findings by Desai et al. (2005b) for the sign of
foreign investment. In order to distinguish between horizontal and vertical multinationals,
we follow empirical evidence by Hanson et al. (2001) and assume that firms in the manufac-
turing sectors are mainly vertical multinationals while multinationals operating in the other
sectors are mainly horizontal.1 We find a complementary relation between domestic and for-
eign investment for horizontal multinationals, but find a substitutional relation for vertical
multinationals. If we further refine the link between domestic and foreign investments, the
econometric results show that the substitution effect for vertical MNE is moderated if the
factor shares of the intermediate goods are more equal and if the shares of the intermediate
goods in final goods production are more equal. This result is also predicted by the theoretical
model.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model. Section 3
performs a comparative steady state analysis of the theoretical model and derives empirically
1We also provide empirical evidence, suggesting that this way to distinguish between horizontal and vertical
FDI is appropriate.
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testable predictions. Section 4 tests the theoretical predictions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Basic model
2.1 Overview
This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model, which is a dynamic extension of the
Knowledge–Capital model by Markusen (2002). The model consists of two countries, a home
country H and a foreign country F.
The representative household in each country consumes several varieties of a differentiated
good X and a homogeneous good Z. Good X is produced by multinational firms.
It is assumed that households aggregate the varieties of good X according to a CES–
function like in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Furthermore, it is assumed that the number of
firms in sector X is sufficiently large so that the market for good X is characterized by large–
group monopolistic competition (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 2000). Sector Z firms behave
perfectly competitively.
The home country H and the foreign country F are endowed with two factors of pro-
duction, labor L and capital K, which are mobile between sectors but immobile between
countries. Labor and capital are used for the following production activities: first, both fac-
tors are used to produce the homogeneous final good Z. Second, labor and capital are used
to produce two intermediate goods v1 and v2; both intermediate goods are assembled to give
a unique variety of the differentiated final good X.
Each country’s labor endowment is constant over time. Each country’s capital endowment,
in contrast, is determined endogenously via the Ramsey growth model and therefore flexible in
the long–run. Relative factor endowments are therefore flexible in the long–run as well. Due
to this dynamic extension of Markusen’s (2002) Knowledge–Capital model the firm regime
has to be determined exogenously. In the first regime, only horizontal multinational firms are
active. In the second regime, only vertical multinational firms are active.
The reason for the exogenous determination of the firm regime is the following: in the
dynamic setup of this paper, a unique causal relationship between the firm regime and the
countries’ relative factor endowments is missing. On the one hand, the firm regime influences
relative factor demands by firms and, therefore, the countries’ relative factor endowments in
the steady state.2 On the other hand, the countries’ relative factor endowments influence
relative factor prices and, therefore, the firm regime.3
2Baxter (1992) shows that a country’s relative factor endowments in the steady state of a Ramsey growth
model depend on the firms’ factor demands.
3The Knowledge–Capital model by Markusen (2002) explains the influence of the countries’ relative factor
endowments on the firm regime. Note that the Knowledge–Capital model is a static model, i.e. the relative
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Two different general steady state equilibria accordingly exist in this dynamic setup. First,
a general equilibrium with horizontal multinational firms and the corresponding relative factor
endowments in the steady state. Second, a general equilibrium with vertical multinational
firms and the corresponding relative factor endowments in the steady state. This paper
accordingly determines the firm regime exogenously. Afterwards, the countries’ corresponding
(relative) factor endowments in the steady state are derived.
In the first firm regime with only horizontal multinational firms, each firm has two pro-
duction plants, one in country H and one in country F. Both production plants produce both
intermediate goods v1 and v2. In the second firm regime with only vertical multinational
firms, each firm has also two production plants, one in country H and one in country F.
However, each production plant produces only one of the two intermediate goods v1 and v2.4
Both horizontal and vertical multinational firms produce with economies of scale, which are
due to the existence of fixed production costs.
Several assumptions are necessary in order to get straightforward analytical results. First,
both countries are completely identical with respect to technology parameters and preference
parameters; only the income share households spend on the varieties of good X and on good
Z is allowed to differ between countries. Second, international trade of both intermediate
goods, the varieties of good X and good Z is assumed to be costless. Third, this paper
assumes that either only horizontal multinational firms or only vertical multinational firms
are active. Fourth, this paper assumes a specific ranking of the factor intensities of all 4 goods;
still, this ranking is in line with previous empirical studies. Finally, the model only considers
the countries’ steady states; therefore, the time index is included only when necessary.
In order to analyze whether domestic and foreign capital expenditures are complements
or substitutes, the steady state of the 2–country world will be disturbed by four persistent
exogenous shocks: a symmetric and an asymmetric increase in country size and a symmetric
and an asymmetric demand shift towards the multinational firms’ good.
If the capital stocks of both countries move into the same direction due to the exogenous
shock, domestic and foreign capital expenditures are complements. If the capital stocks of
both countries move into different directions due to the exogenous shock, domestic and foreign
factor endowments are exogenously given and are not influenced by the firm regime.
4Note that the definition of vertical multinational firms in this paper differs from the definition of vertical
multinational firms in the Knowledge–Capital model by Markusen (2002). There are no intermediate goods
in the Knowledge–Capital model. In the Knowledge–Capital model vertical multinational firms produce the
final good directly with labor and capital in one country only; headquarter services are produced in the other
country and are exported to the production plant. The additional separation of the production process into
two intermediate goods like in this paper takes into account that vertical multinational firms in general never
separate the entire production process from the headquarter services, but only the most labor intensive part
of the production process (e.g., UNCTAD, 2007).
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capital expenditures are substitutes.
The following subsections separately describe the ingredients into the dynamic general
equilibrium model. Subsection 2.2 describes the production side of both countries, subsec-
tion 2.3 describes the dynamic structure of the model, subsection 2.4 derives factor price
equalization between both countries in the steady state, subsection 2.5 defines horizontal and
vertical multinational firms and subsection 2.6 describes the demand side of both countries.
Subsections 2.7 and 2.8 describe two additional conditions which have to hold in each period
of the steady state: first, the free entry condition in the multinational firms’ sector and,
second, the trade balance equation.
2.2 Production
Both countries have the same technologies for producing all goods.
The homogeneous good Z is produced according to the following Cobb–Douglas produc-
tion function:
Z =
Lβ ·K1−β
ββ · (1− β)1−β ; (1)
since good Z represents the average outside good, its factor shares are assumed to be ‘average’
as well. Therefore, β will be set equal to 0.5 during the comparative steady state analysis in
section 3. The per unit cost function which is dual to the production function in equation
(1) is given by:
cZ (wi, ri) = w
β
i · r1−βi , (2)
where wi and ri stand for the price per unit labor and the capital rental rate in country i.
Since sector Z firms behave perfectly competitively, they sell their good at price pZ = cZ .
Intermediate goods v1 and v2 are produced according to the following Cobb–Douglas
production functions:
v1 =
Lφ1 ·K1−φ1
φφ11 · (1− φ1)1−φ1
, with 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5, (3)
v2 =
Lφ2 ·K1−φ2
φφ22 · (1− φ2)1−φ2
, with φ2 = 1− φ1. (4)
Note that intermediate good v1 is assumed to be more capital intensive than the outside good
Z, while intermediate good v2 is assumed to be more labor intensive than the outside good
Z. These assumptions on φ1 and φ2 therefore allow to consider the empirical regularity that
multinational firms, if they are vertical, relocate the most labor intensive production activities
to the relatively labor rich country, while they keep the more capital intensive production
activities in the relatively capital rich country (Blomstro¨m and Kokko, 1997; Hummels et
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al., 1998; UNCTAD, 2007).5 The marginal cost functions which are dual to the production
functions in equations (3) and (4) are given by:
cv1 (wi, ri) = w
φ1
i · r1−φ1i and cv2 (wi, ri) = wφ2i · r1−φ2i , i = H, F. (5)
Intermediate goods v1 and v2 are assembled to a unique variety of the differentiated final
good X according to the following Cobb–Douglas production function:
X =
vα1 · v1−α2
αα · (1− α)1−α , with 0.5 < α ≤ 1. (6)
The parameter restrictions 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5 and 0.5 < α ≤ 1 imply that good X is produced
capital intensively relative to good Z.
The per unit cost function which is dual to the production function in equation (6) is
given by:
cX (wi, wj , ri, rj) = cαv1 · c1−αv2 = wφ1·αi · w
φ2·(1−α)
j · rα·(1−φ1)i · r(1−φ2)·(1−α)j , i, j = H, F.
(7)
2.3 Dynamic structure
The model is extended to a Ramsey growth setup. Including the time index t, utility in a
single period t in country i, i = H,F , is given by the following Cobb–Douglas function:
Ui,t = X
γi
i,t · Z1−γii,t , 0 < γi < 1, (8)
where Xi,t denotes a CES–aggregate of all consumed varieties of good X in period t in country
i and Zi,t the consumption of good Z in period t in country i. The parameter γi has the
index i since it is allowed to differ between countries.
Country i’s capital stock Ki,t in period t is determined endogenously via the investment
decision by country i’s representative household. It is assumed that only good Z is used
for investment. The household chooses the consumption and investment level in each period
such that lifetime utility V is maximized. If ρ denotes the time discount rate, lifetime utility
of the households is given by:6
Vi =
∞∑
t=0
1
(1 + ρ)t
· u (Ui,t) , (9)
where u represents the household’s instantaneous utility function.
5The assumption that φ2 exactly equals 1−φ1 simplifies calculations, but is not crucial for the final results.
6All parameters without a country index are assumed to be identical across countries.
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If δ stands for the depreciation rate for capital, investment into the country’s capital stock
in period t of the steady state is given by:7
Ii,t = Ki,t+1 − (1− δ) ·Ki,t. (10)
Ii,t denotes the amount of good Z, which is invested in period t. Equation (10) implies that
one unit of good Z, which is invested in period t, leads to one unit of capital in period t+ 1.
It is assumed that the country’s household and sector Z–firms behave perfectly competi-
tively. The household owns the production factors and lends them out to firms for production
purposes. The steady state of the economy is then described by several necessary first order
conditions.8 Four of these necessary first order conditions already determine the country’s
factor price ratio in the steady state:
ri,t + (1− δ) · pZ,i,t = pK,i,t (11)
ri,t = pZ,i,t ·
(
1− β
β
· LZ,i,t
KZ,i,t
)β
(12)
wi,t = pZ,i,t ·
(
β
1− β ·
KZ,i,t
LZ,i,t
)1−β
(13)
pK,i,t+1
1 + ρ
= pZ,i,t, (14)
where pK,i,t denotes the price per unit capital in country i period t and LZ,i,t and KZ,i,t the
labor and capital input in sector Z of country i in period t.
Equation (11) is the arbitrage condition for the household’s capital lending behavior:
households are only willing to lend out capital to firms if the capital rental rate ri,t plus the
value of the remaining unit of capital in period t+ 1, which is given by (1− δ) · pZ,i,t, equals
the price per unit capital today.
Equations (12) and (13) are the usual conditions for a profit maximizing factor input
choice by firms.
Equation (14) denotes the Euler equation, which describes the dynamically optimizing
behavior of a household: the household chooses the investment level such that, in the steady
state, the discounted value of a unit capital in t+ 1 equals the value of a unit of good Z in t.
The time index t is omitted from now on since only the steady state is considered in the
following.
Substituting equation (14) into equation (11) leads to ri + (1− δ) · pZ,i = (1 + ρ) · pZ,i,
which can be simplified to ripZ,i = ρ+ δ.
7Note that the country’s labor endowment is assumed to be constant over time. Investment in the steady
state therefore only compensates for depreciation.
8Cf. Baxter (1992), p. 738, for these necessary first order conditions.
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Substituting ripZ,i = ρ + δ into equation (12) and solving for
KZ,i
LZ,i
results in KZ,iLZ,i =
1−β
β ·(
1
ρ+δ
)1/β
.
Substituting KZ,iLZ,i =
1−β
β ·
(
1
ρ+δ
)1/β
into equation (13) results in wipZ,i = (ρ+ δ)
(β−1)/β.
Dividing wipZ,i by
ri
pZ,i
gives:
wi
ri
= (ρ+ δ)−1/β . (15)
The further analysis simplifies considerably since, in this dynamic setup, the factor price
ratio in the steady state is already determined by the parameters ρ, δ and β. Therefore, in
this dynamic setup, it is not necessary to take the factor market equilibrium conditions to
determine the factor price ratio in the steady state.9
Instead, the factor price ratio from equation (15) can be substituted into the factor market
equilibrium conditions. The factor market equilibrium conditions can then be used to solve
for the steady state capital stock, which is endogenous in this dynamic setup. Furthermore,
section 3 shows that the factor market equilibrium conditions can be used to solve for the
number of multinational firms in the steady state.
Most importantly, section 3 shows that the factor market equilibrium conditions are linear
in the steady state capital stock and the number of firms, i.e. the factor market equilibrium
conditions can be solved analytically for these two variables.
2.4 Factor price equalization in the steady state
The assumption of identical technologies and preferences in both countries implies that the
parameters ρ, δ and β are identical in both countries, i.e. wHrH equals
wF
rF
due to equation
(15). Furthermore, costless trade of good Z between countries leads to:
pZ,H = w
β
H · r1−βH = wβF · r1−βF = pZ,F (16)
⇐⇒
(
wH
rH
)β
· rH =
(
wF
rF
)β
· rF . (17)
Since wHrH =
wF
rF
in the steady state, equation (17) implies that rH = rF in the steady state. If
the capital rental rate is identical, the price per unit labor must be identical in both countries
in the steady state as well. The factor prices are therefore written without a country index
in the following.
The per unit costs for a variety of good X can accordingly be written as:
cX = wξ · r1−ξ, with ξ = φ1 · α+ φ2 · (1− α) . (18)
9Note that the factor market equilibrium conditions are non–linear in factor prices if, e.g., Cobb–Douglas
production technologies are assumed. Therefore, in a static setup, in which the equilibrium factor price
ratio has to be determined by the factor market equilibrium conditions, analytical solutions are typically not
available.
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2.5 Horizontal versus vertical multinational firms
2.5.1 Horizontal multinational firms
A single horizontal multinational firm with headquarters in country i, i = H, F , has two pro-
duction plants, one in country H and one in country F . Each production plant produces both
intermediate goods v1 and v2 and assembles them to a unique variety of good X. Since each
production plant produces a unique variety of good X, the final output of each production
plant is sold domestically and exported to the other country.
Note that a single horizontal multinational firm sells two unique varieties of good X since
it owns two production plants.
Chart 1 of figure 1 illustrates the allocation of production activities across countries
for horizontal multinational firms. The arrows from headquarter services (HQS) to both
production plants (PP) indicate that headquarter services are produced in one country, but
supplied to the production plants in both countries.
2.5.2 Vertical multinational firms
A single vertical multinational firm with headquarters in country i, i = H, F , has two pro-
duction plants as well, one in country H and one in country F . However, each production
plant produces only either intermediate good v1 or intermediate good v2. Since vertical multi-
national firms typically have an identical allocation of production activities across countries
(e.g., Markusen, 2002), it is assumed that intermediate good v1 is only produced by produc-
tion plants in country H and intermediate good v2 is only produced by production plants in
country F .
Therefore, the production plants in country H import intermediate good v2 and the
production plants in country F import intermediate good v1. Each production plant then
assembles both intermediate goods to a unique variety of good X. Since each production plant
produces a unique variety of good X, each production plant sells its variety both domestically
and to the other country.
Note again that a single vertical multinational firm sells two unique varieties of good X
since it owns two production plants.
Charts 2 and 3 of figure 1 illustrate the allocation of production activities across countries
for vertical multinational firms.
9
2.6 Demand
The household’s utility in country i in a single period of the steady state is given by:
Ui = X
γi
i · Z1−γii , 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1, (19)
with Xi =
[
(NH +NF ) ·X(σ−1)/σii + (NH +NF ) ·X(σ−1)/σji
]σ/(σ−1)
, σ > 1
and Zi = Zii + Zji.
σ stands for the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of good X and NH and
NF stand for the number of multinational firms with headquarters in country H and F .
Whether these firms are horizontal or vertical multinational firms is determined exogenously
later, when the general steady state equilibrium is derived. Xii stands for the supply of a
production plant from country i to country i. Xji stands for the supply of a production plant
from country j to country i. Similarly, Zii stands for the supply of good Z from country i to
country i and Zji stands for the supply of good Z from country j to country i.
It is assumed that the sum NH +NF is sufficiently large so that the market for good X
is characterized by large–group monopolistic competition. Profit maximizing sector X firms
then supply their unique varieties of good X at price pX = σσ−1 · cX . Since factor prices are
identical in both countries in the steady state, cX does not have a country index.
The price index which is dual to the CES–aggregate Xi is then given by:
P =
[
(NH +NF ) · p1−σX + (NH +NF ) · p1−σX
]1/(1−σ)
= (NH +NF )
1/(1−σ) · σ
σ − 1 · w
ξ · r1−ξ · 21/(1−σ). (20)
If
Mi = Li · w +Ki · r (21)
denotes aggregate factor income of country i, i = H,F , the supply = demand–conditions for
a variety of good X result as:
Xii = p−σX · P σ−1 ·Mi · γi =
(
σ
σ − 1 · w
ξ · r1−ξ
)−σ
·
(
σ
σ−1 · wξ · r1−ξ
)σ−1
2 · (NH +NF ) ·Mi · γi
= γi · σ − 1
σ
· 1
wξ · r1−ξ ·
Mi
2 · (NH +NF ) , i = H,F, (22)
and, similarly,
Xij = γj · σ − 1
σ
· 1
wξ · r1−ξ ·
Mj
2 · (NH +NF ) , i, j = H,F, i 6= j. (23)
Note that the left–hand sides of equations (22) and (23) denote the supply of a single pro-
duction plant from country i to country i or j. The right–hand sides of equations (22) and
10
(23) accordingly denote the demand in country i or j for a unique variety which is produced
by a production plant from country i.
The supply = demand–condition for good Z and country i can be derived as:
Zii + Zji =
Mi
pZ
· (1− γi) , i, j = H, F, i 6= j. (24)
2.7 Free entry condition
If entry into sector X is unrestricted, the free entry condition for sector X has to hold in each
period of the steady state. The free entry condition sets total markup revenue of a single
multinational firm equal to total fixed costs of this firm. The free entry condition of a single
multinational firm is given by:
(pX − cX) · (XHH +XHF +XFF +XFH) = r · (FHQS+PP + FPP ) , (25)
where the left–hand side of equation (25) denotes total markup revenue of a single multina-
tional firm and the right–hand side of equation (25) denotes total fixed costs of this firm.
pX − cX stands for the markup revenue per unit of good X sales. The sum XHH +XHF
denotes total sales of the firm’s production plant in country H and the sum XFF + XFH
denotes total sales of the firm’s production plant in country F . FHQS+PP stands for the fixed
capital input in the country of the firm’s headquarters. FHQS+PP is used for running the
entire firm, i.e. for producing headquarter services (HQS), and for maintaining the production
plant (PP) in the country of the firm’s headquarters. FPP stands for the fixed capital input
in the host country. FPP is used for maintaining the production plant in the host country.
The term r · (FHQS+PP + FPP ) accordingly denotes total fixed costs of a single multinational
firm.
Substituting the expressions for XHH , XHF , XFF and XFH (equations (22) and (23))
into equation (25) and considering that pX = σσ−1 · cX = σσ−1 ·wξ · r1−ξ leads to the following
simplification of the free entry condition:
MH · γH +MF · γF
σ · (NH +NF ) = r · (FHQS+PP + FPP ) . (26)
2.8 Trade balance equation
The trade pattern between countries depends on whether horizontal or vertical multinational
firms are active. In the regime with horizontal multinational firms, countries only trade the
varieties of the differentiated good X and good Z.10 In the regime with vertical multinational
10Note that the varieties of good X are traded even between completely identical countries due to Dixit–
Stiglitz preferences for good X (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 2000). Good Z is only traded if trade in the
varieties of good X is not balanced.
11
firms, countries additionally trade intermediate goods v1 and v2.11
The trade balance equation is therefore derived separately for either firm regime.
2.8.1 Trade balance equation with horizontal multinational firms
Trade between countries H and F is balanced if the value of exports equals the value of
imports, i.e. if the following holds:
ZHF · pZ + (NH +NF ) ·XHF · pX = ZFH · pZ + (NH +NF ) ·XFH · pX . (27)
The left–hand side (right–hand side) of equation (27) denotes the value of country H’s exports
(imports). Since XHF and XFH stand for exports of a single production plant from country
H and F , the quantities XHF and XFH have to be multiplied by NH+NF . The sum NH+NF
denotes the total number of firms and each firm owns a production plant in each country.
Considering that country H’s imports of good Z are country F ’s exports of good Z, the
variable ZFH can be set equal to zero and ZHF is allowed to be negative. Substituting the
expressions for XHF and XFH (equation (23)) into equation (27), considering pZ = wβ · r1−β
and pX = σσ−1 · wξ · r1−ξ and simplification leads to the following expressions for the trade
balance equation:
ZHF =
MH · γH −MF · γF
2 · wβ · r1−β . (28)
2.8.2 Trade balance equation with vertical multinational firms
Trade of intermediate goods between countries has to be considered as well in this firm regime.
Country H’s imports of intermediate good v2 are equal to:
∂cX
∂cv2
· (XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF ) . (29)
∂cX
∂cv2
denotes the input of intermediate good v2 per unit of good X due to Shephard’s Lemma.
(XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF ) denotes total production of good X in country H. Considering
equations (5) and (7), ∂cX∂cv2 can be calculated as:
∂cX
∂cv2
= (1− α) ·
(
cv1
cv2
)α
= (1− α) ·
(
wφ1H · r1−φ1H
wφ2F · r1−φ2F
)α
= (1− α) ·
(w
r
)α·(φ1−φ2)
, (30)
where the last equality uses the fact that factor prices are identical in both countries in the
steady state with free trade.
11Strictly speaking, intermediate goods v1 and v2 are traded within the firm. However, production of
intermediate goods leads to factor income, which leads to demand for final goods in the country of production.
Trade of intermediate goods therefore has to be considered as well in the trade balance equation.
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Similarly, country F ’s imports of intermediate good v1 are equal to:
∂cX
∂cv1
· (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF ) . (31)
Again, ∂cX∂cv1 denotes the input of intermediate good v1 per unit of good X due to Shephard’s
Lemma and (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF ) denotes total production of good X in country F .
Considering equations (5) and (7), ∂cX∂cv1 results as:
∂cX
∂cv1
= α ·
(
cv2
cv1
)1−α
= α ·
(
wφ2F · r1−φ2F
wφ1H · r1−φ1H
)1−α
= α ·
(w
r
)(1−α)·(φ2−φ1)
. (32)
The trade balance equation in the regime with vertical multinational firms accordingly results
as follows:
ZHF · pZ +
[
α ·
(w
r
)(1−α)·(φ2−φ1) · (XFF +XFH) · wφ1 · r1−φ1 +XHF · pX] · (NH +NF )
= ZFH · pZ +
[
(1− α) ·
(w
r
)α·(φ1−φ2) · (XHH +XHF ) · wφ2 · r1−φ2 +XFH · pX] ·(NH +NF ) .
(33)
Again, ZFH is set equal to zero and ZHF is allowed to be negative since country H’s imports
of good Z are equal to country F ’s exports of good Z. Substituting the expressions for XHH ,
XFF , XHF and XFH (equations (22) and (23)) into equation (33), considering pZ = wβ ·r1−β
and pX = σσ−1 · wξ · r1−ξ and simplification leads to the following expression for the trade
balance equation:
ZHF =
σ − 1
σ
· MH · γH +MF · γF
2 · wβ · r1−β · (1− 2 · α) +
MH · γH −MF · γF
2 · wβ · r1−β . (34)
3 General steady state equilibrium
The general steady state equilibrium for this 2–country world is characterized by:
1. the condition wr = (ρ+ δ)
−1/β since countries are in the steady state (equation (15))
2. the supply = demand conditions for each variety of good X (equations (22) and (23))
3. the free entry condition for sector X (equation (26))
4. the trade balance equation (equation (28) or equation (34))
5. two factor market equilibrium conditions for each country.
Conditions 1.–4. can be substituted into the two factor market equilibrium conditions for
each country. The general steady state equilibrium for this 2–country world can then be
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represented by a system of four equations, which are linear in four variables. The four
variables are the numbers of multinational firms NH and NF and the countries’ capital
endowments KH and KF in the steady state.
If NH , NF , KH and KF are known and if one production factor, e.g., labor in country H,
is chosen as the nume´raire good, the steady state values of all quantity variables and relative
prices can be derived:
• the relative price of capital follows from equation (15);
• the relative prices of intermediate goods v1 and v2 follow from equation (5), the relative
prices of the final goods Z and X follow from equations (2) and (18);
• aggregate factor income in both countries follows from equation (21);
• demand for the varieties of good X follows from equations (22) and (23), aggregate
demand for good Z follows from equation (24);
• trade in the varieties of good X follows from equation (23), trade in good Z follows
from equation (28) or equation (34);
• trade in intermediate goods v1 and v2 in the regime with vertical multinational activity
follows from equations (29) and (31);
• finally, utility of either country follows from substituting the consumed quantities into
equation (19).
Since horizontal and vertical multinational firms have different production patterns, the factor
market equilibrium conditions differ between both firm regimes. Therefore, the general steady
state equilibrium is derived separately for both firm regimes.
In order to simplify the setup of the general steady state equilibrium, the capital depre-
ciation rate δ is normalized to zero. Since each country’s labor endowment is assumed to
be constant over time, investment in the steady state is therefore equal to zero as well. If
a persistent exogenous shock in the comparative steady state analysis shifts the country to
a new steady state with a larger (smaller) capital stock, investment is temporarily positive
(negative).
3.1 Horizontal multinational firms
Horizontal multinational firms produce both intermediate goods v1 and v2 in each production
plant. The per unit costs of good X are accordingly given by:
cX (wi, ri) = w
φ1·α
i · wφ2·(1−α)i · r(1−φ1)·αi · r(1−φ2)·(1−α)i = wξ · r1−ξ, (35)
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with ξ = φ1 · α+ φ2 · (1− α).
Applying Shephard’s Lemma, the factor input coefficients for labor and capital into good X,
aXL (w, r) and a
X
K (w, r), result as:
aXL (w, r) ≡
∂cX (w, r)
∂w
= ξ ·
( r
w
)1−ξ
and aXK (w, r) ≡
∂cX (w, r)
∂r
= (1− ξ) ·
(w
r
)ξ
.
The corresponding factor input coefficients for good Z are given by:
aZL (w, r) ≡
∂cZ (w, r)
∂w
= β ·
( r
w
)1−β
and aZK (w, r) ≡
∂cZ (w, r)
∂r
= (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β
.
The factor input coefficients aXL (w, r), a
X
K (w, r), a
Z
L (w, r) and a
Z
K (w, r) are used to derive
the factor market equilibrium conditions for either country. Note that NH and NF stand for
the mass of active horizontal multinational firms, XHH , XHF , XFF and XFH stand for the
supply of a single horizontal multinational firm and Ni ·FHQS+PP and Nj ·FPP , i, j = H,F ,
stand for the capital demand for producing fixed costs:
equilibrium on labor market of country H:
ξ ·
( r
w
)1−ξ · (XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF ) + β · ( r
w
)1−β · (ZHH + ZHF ) = LH (36)
equilibrium on capital market of country H:
(1− ξ) ·
(w
r
)ξ · (XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF )
+NH · FHQS+PP +NF · FPP + (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β · (ZHH + ZHF ) = KH (37)
equilibrium on labor market of country F:
ξ ·
( r
w
)1−ξ · (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF ) + β · ( r
w
)1−β · ZFF = LF (38)
equilibrium on capital market of country F:
(1− ξ) ·
(w
r
)ξ · (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF )
+NH · FPP +NF · FHQS+PP + (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β · ZFF = KF . (39)
Substituting the expressions for XHH , XHF , XFF and XFH (equations (22) and (23)) into
the factor market equilibrium conditions, considering the free entry condition (equation (26))
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and the trade balance equation (equation (28)) leads to the following simplification of the
factor market equilibrium conditions:
ξ · σ − 1
2
· r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF )
+
MH
w
· β ·
(
1− γH
2
)
+
MF
w
· β · −γF
2
= LH (40)
(1− ξ) · σ − 1
2
· r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF ) +NH · r
w
· FHQS+PP +NF · r
w
· FPP
+
MH
w
· (1− β) ·
(
1− γH
2
)
+
MF
w
· (1− β) · −γF
2
=
r
w
·KH (41)
ξ · σ − 1
2
· r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF )
+
MH
w
· β · −γH
2
+
MF
w
· β ·
(
1− γF
2
)
= LF (42)
(1− ξ) · σ − 1
2
· r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF ) +NH · r
w
· FPP +NF · r
w
· FHQS+PP
+
MH
w
· (1− β) · −γH
2
+
MF
w
· (1− β) ·
(
1− γF
2
)
=
r
w
·KF . (43)
Since the factor price ratio rw is already fixed by the parameters ρ, δ and β in the steady
state (equation (15)), equations (40)–(43) are linear in the four variables NH , NF , KH and
KF .
The steady state of this 2–country world, which is described by equations (40)–(43), is
now disturbed by four different persistent exogenous shocks. The first shock is a symmetric
demand shift in favor of good X, i.e. dγH = dγF > 0. The second shock is a demand shift
in favor of good X only in country H, i.e. dγH > 0 and dγF = 0.12 The third shock is a
symmetric increase in population size, i.e. dLH = dLF > 0. The fourth shock is an increase
in population size only in country H, i.e. dLH > 0 and dLF = 0.
Note that these four shocks are the only relevant ones.13
12In order to keep the model analytically solvable, it is assumed that γH = γF in the initial steady state
as described by equations (40)–(43). If the initial steady state is disturbed by an asymmetric demand shift
towards good X, we have γH 6= γF in the new steady state.
13If the steady state were disturbed by an asymmetric shock in the production technologies, countries
completely specialized in the production of either good X or good Z (cf. Baxter, 1992). However, if there
is complete specialization in production, no horizontal multinational firms, which produce good X in both
countries, do exist. If, alternatively, the steady state were disturbed by an asymmetric shock in the elasticity
of substitution σ, the model were not analytically solvable any more. The reason is as follows: if σ differs
between countries, equation (26) becomes(
γH · MH
σH
+ γF · MF
σF
)
· (NH +NF )−1 = r ·
(
FHQS+PP + FPP
)
.
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If the capital stocks of both countries, KH and KF , move into the same direction due to
the shock, i.e. if dKHdKF > 0, domestic and foreign investments are complements. If the capital
stocks KH and KF move into opposite directions due to the shock, i.e. dKHdKF < 0, domestic
and foreign investments are substitutes.
Based on the comparative steady state analysis, which is relegated to appendix A, we
can derive hypotheses H1 and H2 on the relationship between KH and KF if multinational
activity is horizontal:
H1: In the case of
• a symmetric demand shift
(
dγH = dγF > 0
)
• an asymmetric demand shift
(
dγH > 0 and dγF = 0
)
• a symmetric increase in population size
(
dLH = dLF > 0
)
the domestic and the foreign capital stock are perfect complements with dKHdKF = 1.
H2: In the case of an asymmetric increase in population size
(
dLH > 0 and dLF = 0
)
the domestic and the foreign capital stock are complements with dKHdKF > 0.
Proof: See appendix A.
The intuition for these results is as follows: in the case of horizontal multinational activity,
multinational firms produce both intermediate goods v1 and v2 in both countries. The factor
intensities of multinational production are therefore identical in both countries. Moreover,
any of the considered shocks increases good X production in both countries:
(i) A demand shift towards good X (dγH = dγF > 0 or dγH > 0 and dγF = 0) increases
good X production relative to good Z production in both countries.14
(ii) A symmetric increase in population size (dLH = dLF > 0) increases production of goods
X and Z in both countries proportionately.
However, the sum Xii +Xij in the factor market equilibrium conditions equals(
σH − 1
σH
· γH ·MH + σF − 1
σF
· γF ·MF
)
· (NH +NF )−1
if σ differs between countries. Therefore, Xii + Xij in the factor market equilibrium conditions cannot be
substituted by r · (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (σ− 1) from equation (26) if σ differs between countries. However, this
substitution is necessary to get the factor market equilibrium conditions linear in NH and NF like in equations
(40)–(43).
14Note that also an asymmetric demand shock increases good X production in both countries since house-
holds demand varieties from both countries due to Dixit–Stiglitz preferences.
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(iii) An asymmetric increase in population size (dLH > 0 and dLF = 0) increases production
of goods X and Z in country H proportionately and it increases production of good X
in country F since country H increases its imports of good X.
In either case demand for capital increases in both countries since good X is capital intensive
relative to good Z. The increase in capital demand increases the steady state capital stock
in both countries.
3.2 Vertical multinational firms
Vertical multinational firms produce intermediate good v1 in their production plant in country
H and intermediate good v2 in their production plant in country F . The per unit costs of
good X are accordingly given by:
cX (wH , wF , rH , rF ) = w
φ1·α
H · wφ2·(1−α)F · r(1−φ1)·αH · r(1−φ2)·(1−α)F . (44)
Applying Shephard’s Lemma and considering afterwards factor price equalization in the
steady state, the factor input coefficients for good X, which are given by aXL,i(wH , wF , rH , rF )
and aXK,i (wH , wF , rH , rF ), i = H,F , can be derived as:
aXLH (wH , wF , rH , rF ) ≡
∂cX (wH , wF , rH , rF )
∂wH
= φ1 · α ·
( r
w
)1−ξ
,
aXKH (wH , wF , rH , rF ) ≡
∂cX (wH , wF , rH , rF )
∂rH
= (1− φ1) · α ·
(w
r
)ξ
,
aXLF (wH , wF , rH , rF ) ≡
∂cX (wH , wF , rH , rF )
∂wF
= φ2 · (1− α) ·
( r
w
)1−ξ
and
aXKF (wH , wF , rH , rF ) ≡
∂cX (wH , wF , rH , rF )
∂rF
= (1− φ2) · (1− α) ·
(w
r
)ξ
,
with ξ = φ1 · α + φ2 · (1− α). Again, the corresponding factor input coefficients for good Z
are given by:
aZL (w, r) ≡
∂cZ (w, r)
∂w
= β ·
( r
w
)1−β
and aZK (w, r) ≡
∂cZ (w, r)
∂r
= (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β
.
These factor input coefficients are used to derive the factor market equilibrium conditions
for either country. NH and NF now stand for the mass of active vertical multinational firms
and XHH , XHF , XFF , XFH stand for the supply of a single vertical multinational firm:
equilibrium on labor market of country H:
φ1 · α ·
( r
w
)1−ξ · (XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF ) + β · ( r
w
)1−β · (ZHH + ZHF ) = LH (45)
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equilibrium on capital market of country H:
(1− φ1) · α ·
(w
r
)ξ · (XHH +XHF ) · (NH +NF )
+NH · FHQS+PP +NF · FPP + (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β · (ZHH + ZHF ) = KH (46)
equilibrium on labor market of country F:
φ2 · (1− α) ·
( r
w
)1−ξ · (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF ) + β · ( r
w
)1−β · ZFF = LF (47)
equilibrium on capital market of country F:
(1− φ2) · (1− α) ·
(w
r
)ξ · (XFF +XFH) · (NH +NF )
+NH · FPP +NF · FHQS+PP + (1− β) ·
(w
r
)β · ZFF = KF . (48)
Substituting the expressions for XHH , XHF , XFF and XFH (equations (22) and (23)) into
the factor market equilibrium conditions, considering the free entry condition (equation (26))
and the trade balance equation (equation (34)) leads to the following simplification of the
factor market equilibrium conditions:
φ1 · α · σ − 12 ·
r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF )
+
MH
w
· β ·
(
1− γH
2
· 2 · α · (σ − 1) + 1
σ
)
+
MF
w
· β · γF
2
· 2 · α · (1− σ)− 1
σ
= LH (49)
(1−φ1) ·α · σ − 12 ·
r
w
·(FHQS+PP +FPP ) ·(NH+NF )+NH · r
w
·FHQS+PP +NF · r
w
·FPP
+
MH
w
· (1− β) ·
(
1− 2 · α · (σ − 1) + 1
2 · σ/γH
)
+
MF
w
· (1− β) · 2 · α · (1− σ)− 1
2 · σ/γF =
r
w
·KH (50)
φ2 · (1− α) · σ − 12 ·
r
w
· (FHQS+PP + FPP ) · (NH +NF )
+
MH
w
· β · 1− 2 · α− 2 · σ · (1− α)
2 · σ/γH +
MF
w
· β ·
(
1− 2 · α− 1 + 2 · σ · (1− α)
2 · σ/γF
)
= LF (51)
(1−φ2) ·(1−α) · σ−12 ·
r
w
·(FHQS+PP +FPP ) ·(NH+NF )+NF · r
w
·FHQS+PP +NH · r
w
·FPP
+
MH
w
·(1−β) · 1−2 ·α−2 ·σ ·(1−α)
2 · σ/γH +
MF
w
·(1−β) ·
(
1− 2 ·α−1+2 ·σ ·(1−α)
2 · σ/γF
)
=
r
w
·KF . (52)
Again, since the factor price ratio rw is fixed by the parameters ρ, δ and β in the steady state
(equation (15)), equations (49)–(52) are linear in the four variables NH , NF , KH and KF .
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The steady state in the 2–country world with vertical multinational activity is described
by equations (49)–(52).15
In order to analyze whether vertical multinational activity leads to a different relationship
between the capital stocks KH and KF , compared to horizontal multinational activity, the
steady state with vertical multinational activity is disturbed by the same four persistent
exogenous shocks as before.
The comparative steady state analysis for vertical multinational activity is relegated to
appendix B. The relationship between the capital stocks KH and KF in the regime with
vertical multinational activity is summarized by hypothesis H3:
H3: In the case of
• a symmetric demand shift
(
dγH = dγF > 0
)
• an asymmetric demand shift
(
dγH > 0 and dγF = 0
)
• a symmetric increase in country size
(
dLH = dLF > 0
)
• an asymmetric increase in country size
(
dLH > 0 and dLF = 0
)
the domestic and the foreign capital stock are substitutes, i.e. dKHdKF < 0 if:
• the labor share of intermediate good v1, which is produced in country H, is suffi-
ciently small, i.e. if φ1 is sufficiently small
• the share of intermediate good v1 in final goods production is sufficiently small,
i.e. if α is sufficiently small.
If φ1 and α are not sufficiently small, the domestic and the foreign capital stock are
complements, i.e. dKHdKF > 0.
Proof: See appendix B.
The intuition for these results is as follows: in the case of vertical multinational activity,
multinational firms produce the capital intensive intermediate good v1 in country H and the
labor intensive intermediate good v2 in country F . The factor intensities of multinational
production therefore differ between countries.
In the case of a demand shift towards good X (dγH = dγF > 0 or dγH > 0 and dγF =
0), country H increases v1 production and country F increases v2 production. Aggregate
15It can be shown that the steady state capital stock KF is positive only if LF is sufficiently large relative
to LH . Therefore, the exogenous allocation of the capital–intensive (labor–intensive) intermediate good v1
(v2) to country H (F ) only leads to a well–defined steady state if the exogenous labor endowments are chosen
appropriately.
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production in country H (country F ) therefore becomes more capital (labor) intensive. The
steady state capital stock in country H (country F ) therefore increases (decreases).
In the case of an increase in population size (dLH = dLF > 0 or dLH > 0 and dLF = 0),
the intuition is most straightforward if α is close to 0.5, i.e. if the term 1−2 ·α is close to zero
and if the term MH ·γH−MF ·γF
2·wβ ·r1−β dominates the trade balance equation (34). Two counteracting
effects have to be considered:
(i) Both a symmetric and an asymmetric increase in population size ceteris paribus increase
KH and KF since all production activities also use capital. However, the increase in
KH is larger than the increase in KF since aggregate production in country H is more
capital intensive than aggregate production in country F . Therefore, MH increases by
a larger amount than MF , also in the case of a symmetric increase in population size.
(ii) Since MH increases by a larger amount than MF , exports ZHF increase, i.e. country
F imports (exports) of good Z (intermediate good v2) increase.16 Since v2 is labor
intensive relative to Z, aggregate production in country F becomes more labor intensive.
This ceteris paribus decreases KF in the steady state.
If α is close to 0.5 and if the labor share parameter of v2, which is given by φ2 = 1 − φ1, is
sufficiently large, the second effect dominates the first. KF then decrease with an increase in
population size and KH and KF are substitutes.
If, in the extreme, φ1 = 1 − φ2 = 0.5, the factor intensities of multinational activity
are identical in both countries. The contrast between the vertical and horizontal multina-
tional activity is absent in such a case and the domestic and the foreign capital stocks are
complements.
Figure 2 summarizes the results of the comparative steady state analysis for the regime
with horizontal multinational activity and the regime with vertical multinational activity.
4 Empirical model
Data for the empirical analysis are taken from the website of the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). We constructed a panel with 42 sectors (see table A1 of the appendix), and 7 years
(1999–2005). The BEA data divides the operations of multinational companies into the
operation of the American parent company and its foreign affiliate(s). For the data of the
foreign affiliates, the BEA allows to choose between data for majority–owned foreign affiliates
only or all foreign affiliates, where the latter are defined as outward foreign direct investment
16Note that ZHF can also be negative; the absolute value of ZHF then becomes smaller and country F
exports less of good Z.
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with ownership or control by the parent firm of at least 10%.17 We have chosen to use the
data for the majority owned foreign affiliates. As initial year, 1999 is chosen since the BEA
switched from SIC to the NAICS classification in that year.
In order to test the previously derived hypotheses, we construct four variables at the
sector level: (i) Domestic Investment, defined as domestic capital expenditures of U.S. parent
companies as part of total value added of U.S. parent companies; (ii) Foreign Investment,
defined as foreign capital expenditures of U.S. parent companies as part of total value added
of U.S. parent companies; (iii) Labor Share, defined as the total labor costs of U.S. affiliate
firms as part of total value added of U.S. affiliate firms; (iv) Share Intermediate, defined as
the exports of goods shipped from U.S. parents to foreign affiliates as part of the value added
of the foreign affiliate firms. The last two variables are proxies for φ2 and α, respectively, as
defined in the previous theoretical part.
As to test differences in the relationship between domestic and foreign investment between
horizontal and vertical MNEs, we make the assumption that MNEs in the manufacturing
sectors are mainly vertical, while MNEs in other sectors are mainly horizontal. Table A1 of
the appendix provides some motivation for this choice. It shows that average wages of affiliates
in the manufacturing sectors are on average lower than in the non–manufacturing sectors. If
we examine average wages of foreign affiliates over average wages of U.S. parent firms, the
difference between both sector groups becomes more pronounced. This indicates that wage
differences are more important for manufacturing sectors than for non–manufacturing sectors.
Differences are most prevalent, however, when examining the exports shipped by U.S. parents
to foreign affiliates. The mean of Share Intermediate, as shown in table A2 of the appendix,
indicates that trade in intermediates is almost absent in many non–manufacturing industries,
while exports of intermediates to affiliates constitutes around 43% of the value added of the
affiliate firms in manufacturing industries. Therefore, the distinction between manufacturing
and non–manufacturing seems to capture the main difference between vertical and horizontal
MNEs remarkably well.
4.1 Empirical results
We test the implications of the theoretical model in an econometric model using a U.S. panel
of foreign and domestic investments at the sector level over the period 1999–2005. The results
of our panel with random and fixed sector effects confirm the findings by Desai et al. (2005b)
for the estimated sign of foreign investment. Table 1 (columns 1 and 2) shows that the
estimated coefficient is equal to 0.10 with random and with fixed effects. Column 3 shows
17A more complete description of the BEA data on the operations of U.S. multinational companies can be
found in Slaughter (2000).
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that accounting for a common autoregressive term in the disturbances (estimated at a value
of 0.6) decreases the estimated coefficient in the random effects model slightly to 0.09.18
The main novelty in the regressions is to allow for sector specific estimates of the coefficient
for foreign investment. Table 2 splits the sample in manufacturing and non–manufacturing
sectors and shows the regression results for both categories with random effects across sec-
tors. The sign of the link between foreign investment and domestic investment is opposite
for the manufacturing and the non–manufacturing sectors. While the sign is positive and sig-
nificantly different from zero for the non–manufacturing sectors, the sign is negative for the
manufacturing sectors. Hence, under the assumption that vertical MNEs are primarily active
in manufacturing sectors and horizontal MNEs are primarily active in non–manufacturing
sectors, we can confirm our first hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between
domestic and foreign capital expenditures when MNEs are horizontal while foreign capital
expenditures have a negative effect on domestic capital formation when MNEs are vertical.
Assuming a normal distribution for the parameter estimate, there is a probability of around
7% that the coefficient for foreign investment is positive in the manufacturing sectors. In the
non–manufacturing sectors, the confidence interval shows that the probability of a negative
sign for foreign investment can be neglected.
As a further test for differences in the link between domestic and foreign investment, we
include in table 2 interaction terms between foreign investment and centralized labor share
in a sector and between foreign investment and the centralized share of the intermediate
good produced by the U.S. parent. In line with the predictions from the theoretical model
(hypothesis H3), for the manufacturing sectors the sign for the interaction term is positive
for the share of the intermediate good while negative, though only weakly significant, for the
interaction with the labor share.
The results indicate that manufacturing sectors with an average labor share in the foreign
affiliate (φ2) and an average share of intermediate good imports by the affiliate (α) are
characterized by a negative relationship between foreign and domestic investment. If the
labor share is relatively low and the share of the intermediate good is relatively high, however,
there is a possibility that the sign for foreign investment becomes positive. Examples of such
sectors are sectors with code 3342 (communications equipment) and with code 3361–3363
(motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts); see Table A1.
18We also estimated a dynamic panel model based on system GMM (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998), but, due to the limited number of sectors vis–a–vis the number of instruments, the estimates
depended heavily on the model specification.
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5 Conclusions
Our paper has shown a clear difference between horizontal and vertical multinationals in
explaining the link between domestic and foreign capital expenditures. In the analytical
general equilibrium model we derive a complementary relationship between domestic and
foreign capital expenditures if multinational activity is horizontal. However, if multinational
activity is vertical, the relationship between domestic and foreign capital expenditures is
substitutional or complementary, depending on the firms’ technologies.
We test out theoretical implications with a panel of U.S. multinationals and find empirical
support. First, we find that horizontal multinational activity leads to a complementary
relationship between domestic and foreign capital expenditures, irrespective of the firms’
technologies. Second, we find a substitutional relationship between domestic and foreign
capital expenditures if multinational activity is vertical. In order to refine our empirical
results, we show that the empirical influence of the firms’ technology parameters on this
substitutional link is as predicted by the theoretical model.
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Appendix A — Comparative steady state analysis for the regime with hor-
izontal multinational activity
The system of equations (40)–(43) is differentiated totally.
Cramer’s Rule is then used to calculate the ratio dKH
dKF
. The expression dKH stands for the change of
the domestic capital stock due to the exogenous shock and the expression dKF stands for the change of the
foreign capital stock due to the exogenous shock.
If dKH
dKF
< 0, the domestic and the foreign capital stock are substitutes. If dKH
dKF
> 0, the domestic and
the foreign capital stock are complements. In order to determine the sign of dKH
dKF
, the following parameter
restrictions are used in appendix A:
(i) 0.5 < α ≤ 1, (ii) 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5, (iii) ξ = φ1 ·α+ φ2 · (1−α) = φ1 ·α+ (1− φ1) · (1−α) < 0.5.
Note that restriction (iii) implies that good X is capital intensive relative to good Z; restriction (iii) follows
from restrictions (i) and (ii).
The steady state with horizontal multinational activity is now disturbed by four persistent exogenous
shocks:
1 Symmetric demand shift
(
dγH = dγF > 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
(
LH +
r
w
·KH + LF + rw ·KF
) · 2 · [2 · ξ + σ · (1− 2 · ξ) ]
(
LH +
r
w
·KH + LF + rw ·KF
) · 2 · [2 · ξ + σ · (1− 2 · ξ) ] = 1. (53)
The relationship between KH and KF is therefore complementary in the case of a symmetric demand shift.
2 Asymmetric demand shift
(
dγH > 0, dγF = 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
(
LH +
r
w
·KH
) · [2 · ξ + σ · (1− 2 · ξ)]
(
LH +
r
w
·KH
) · [2 · ξ + σ · (1− 2 · ξ)] = 1. (54)
Equation (54) shows that the relationship between KH and KF remains complementary, even if the demand
shift is asymmetric.
3 Symmetric increase in population size
(
dLH = dLF > 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
2 · (σ · (3− 2 · ξ) + 2 · ξ)
2 · (σ · (3− 2 · ξ) + 2 · ξ) = 1. (55)
The relationship between KH and KF is therefore complementary in the case of a symmetric increase in
population size.
4 Asymmetric increase in population size
(
dLH > 0 and dLF = 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
2 · σ
2 · ξ + σ · (1− 2 · ξ) > 0, since ξ ≤ 0.5. (56)
Equation (56) shows that the relationship between KH and KF remains complementary, even if the increase
in population size is asymmetric. However, KH and KF are no perfect complements any more.
Appendix B — Comparative steady state analysis for the regime with ver-
tical multinational activity
The system of equations (49)–(52) is differentiated totally.
Cramer’s Rule is then used to calculate the ratio dKH
dKF
. Again, the expression dKH stands for the change
of the domestic capital stock due to the exogenous shock and the expression dKF stands for the change of the
foreign capital stock due to the exogenous shock.
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If dKH
dKF
< 0, the domestic and the foreign capital stock are substitutes. If dKH
dKF
> 0, the domestic and
the foreign capital stock are complements. In order to determine the sign of dKH
dKF
, the following parameter
restrictions are used in appendix B:
(i) 0.5 < α ≤ 1, (ii) 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5, (iii) φ2 = 1 − φ1, (iv) σ > 1, (v) γH = γF in the
initial steady state, which is given by equations (49)–(52).
Restrictions (ii) and (iii) imply that intermediate good v1 (intermediate good v2) is capital (labor)
intensive relative to good Z.
The steady state with vertical multinational activity is now disturbed by the same four persistent exoge-
nous shocks as before:
1 Symmetric demand shift
(
dγH = dγF > 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
(MH +MF ) ·
[
1 + σ − 2 · α+ 4 · α · φ1 · σ + 2 · σ2 · α · (1− 2 · φ1)
]
(MH +MF ) ·
[
4 · σ · φ1 · (1− α) · (σ − 1) + (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)− 1 + σ + 2 · α
] , (57)
with MH = LH +
r
w
·KH and MF = LF + rw ·KF . The numerator of dKHdKF is unambiguously positive since,
first, 1 + σ − 2 · α > 0 and, second, 1− 2 · φ1 > 0.
The denominator of dKH
dKF
is negative (positive) if φ1 is smaller (larger) than a threshold value Θ, i.e. if
the following holds:
φ1 <
(
>
)
1− σ − 2 · α− (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)
4 · σ · (1− α) · (σ − 1) ≡ Θ. (58)
Therefore, dKH
dKF
> 0 if φ1 > Θ and
dKH
dKF
< 0 if φ1 < Θ.
For a given σ, the threshold value Θ is strictly positive (negative) if α is sufficiently small (large).19
Therefore, if α is sufficiently small, φ1 < Θ is possible, i.e.
dKH
dKF
< 0 is possible.
However, if α is such that Θ < 0, it always follows that φ1 > Θ. Therefore, if α is not sufficiently small,
dKH
dKF
> 0 results.
Furthermore, the partial derivative ∂Θ
∂α
is negative:
∂Θ
∂α
=
−(σ + 1)
4 · (σ − 1)(α− 1)2 · σ < 0. (59)
Therefore, for given values of φ1 and σ, the inequality φ1 < Θ is more likely to hold the smaller α. The capital
stocks KH and KF are accordingly more likely to be substitutes the smaller α.
2 Asymmetric demand shift
(
dγH > 0, dγF = 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
(
LH +
r
w
·KH
) · [1 + σ − 2 · α+ 4 · α · φ1 · σ + 2 · σ2 · α · (1− 2 · φ1) ](
LH +
r
w
·KH
) · [4 · σ · φ1 · (1− α) · (σ − 1) + (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)− 1 + σ + 2 · α] . (60)
Equation (60) shows that the relationship between KH and KF is identical as in the case with a symmetric
demand shift. Therefore, it still holds that the numerator of dKH
dKF
is unambiguously positive. Again, the
denominator of dKH
dKF
is negative (positive) if φ1 is smaller (larger) than a threshold value Θ, i.e. if the
following holds:
φ1 <
(
>
)
1− σ − 2 · α− (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)
4 · σ · (1− α) · (σ − 1) ≡ Θ. (61)
Again, for a given σ, the threshold value Θ is strictly positive if α is sufficiently small.
Therefore, it still holds that KH and KF are substitutes if φ1 and α are sufficiently small; KH and KF
are complements otherwise.
19If α = 0.5 and σ = 5, for example, the threshold value Θ equals 0.25. If the factor share parameter φ1 is
strictly smaller than 0.25, dKH
dKF
< 0 results. However, if α = 0.9 and σ = 5, for example, the threshold value
Θ equals −0.35. Even if φ1 = 0, dKHdKF > 0 results.
28
3 Symmetric increase in population size
(
dLH = dLF > 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3 + ∆4
∆5 + ∆6 + ∆7 + ∆8
, (62)
with
∆1 = 2 · γ · (α · (σ − 2) + 1) > 0 since 0.5 < α ≤ 1 and σ > 1,
∆2 = σ · (1− γ) + 2 · φ1 · γ · σ · (1 + 2 · α) > 0 since 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,
∆3 = γ · σ2 · (1− 2 · φ1) > 0 since 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5,
∆4 = σ
2 · (2 · α · γ · (1− 2 · φ1) + 1) > 0 since 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5,
∆5 = 2 · γ · (2 · α− 1) + 6 · γ · σ · (1− α) > 0 since 0.5 < α ≤ 1,
∆6 = σ · (γ · (φ1 · (4 · α− 6) + 1) + 1) > 0 since 0.5 < α ≤ 1, 0 ≤ φ1 < 0.5, σ > 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,
∆7 = σ
2 · (γ · (2 · α− 3) + 1) <> 0 since 0.5 < α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,
∆8 = γ · φ1 · σ2 · (6− 4 · α) > 0 since 0.5 < α ≤ 1.
The numerator of dKH
dKF
is positive since ∆1, ∆2, ∆3 and ∆4 are strictly larger than zero.
However, the sign of the denominator is ambiguous. ∆5, ∆6 and ∆8 are strictly larger than zero. ∆7, in
contrast, may be negative.
It can be shown that the sum ∆5 + ∆6 + ∆7 + ∆8 is negative (positive) if φ1 is smaller (larger) than a
threshold value Υ, i.e. if the following holds:
φ1 <
(
>
) −2 · γ · (2 · α− 1)− 6 · γ · σ · (1− α)− γ · σ − σ − σ2 · γ · (2 · α− 3)− σ2
(6− 4 · α) · γ · σ · (σ − 1) ≡ Υ. (63)
Therefore, dKH
dKF
< 0 if φ1 < Υ and
dKH
dKF
> 0 if φ1 > Υ.
For given values of σ and γ, the threshold value Υ is strictly positive (negative) if α is sufficiently small
(large).20
Therefore, if α is sufficiently small, φ1 < Υ is possible, i.e.
KH
KF
< 0 is possible.
However, if α is such that Υ < 0, it always follows that φ1 > Υ, i.e. KH and KF are complements if α is
not sufficiently small.
Furthermore, it can be shown that the partial derivative ∂Υ
∂α
is negative:
∂Υ
∂α
=
4 · γ + σ · (1 + σ − 2 · γ)
(1− σ) · (2 · α− 3)2 · γ · σ < 0. (64)
Therefore, for given values of φ1, σ and γ, the inequality φ1 < Υ is more likely to hold the smaller α. The
capital stocks KH and KF are accordingly more likely to be substitutes the smaller α.
4 Asymmetric increase in country size
(
dLH > 0 and dLF = 0
)
:
dKH
dKF
=
2 · α · γ · (σ − 1) + γ · σ2 · (1− 2 · φ1) + σ · (1 + σ − 2 · γ) + γ + 2 · φ1 · γ · σ
4 · σ · φ1 · (1− α) · (σ − 1) + (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)− 1 + σ + 2 · α . (65)
The numerator of dKH
dKF
is unambiguously positive since, first, 1− 2 · φ1 > 0 and, second, 1 + σ − 2 · γ > 0.
The denominator of dKH
dKF
is negative (positive) if φ1 is smaller (larger) than a threshold value Ξ, i.e., if
the following holds:
φ1 <
(
>
)
1− σ − 2 · α− (1− α) · 2 · σ · (2− σ)
4 · σ · (1− α) · (σ − 1) ≡ Ξ. (66)
Therefore, dKH
dKF
< 0 if φ1 < Ξ and
dKH
dKF
> 0 if φ1 > Ξ.
Since th threshold value Ξ equals the threshold value Θ
(
cf. equation (58)
)
, it follows again that Ξ
increases with a decreasing α. Therefore, φ1 < Ξ is more likely to hold the smaller α. The capital stocks KH
and KF are accordingly more likely to be substitutes the smaller α.
However, if α is such that Ξ < 0, it always follows that φ1 > Ξ, i.e. KH and KF are complements if α is
not sufficiently small.
20If, for example, α = 0.5, σ = 10 and γ = 0.8, the threshold value Υ equals 0.0625. If the factor share
parameter φ1 is strictly smaller than 0.0625,
dKH
dKF
< 0 results. However, if, for example, α = 0.75, σ = 10 and
γ = 0.8, the threshold value Υ equals −0.05. Even if φ1, dKHdKF > 0 results in this case.
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country i: country j:
chart 1: horizontal multinational firms with headquarters in country i, j = H, F, i ≠ j:
HQS
PP:
• production:
v1 & v2
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
PP:
• production:
v1 & v2
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
chart 2: vertical multinational firms with headquarters in country H:
country H: country F:
HQS
PP:
• production: only v1
• exports: v1, imports: v2
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
PP:
• production: only v2
• exports: v2, imports: v1
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
chart 3: vertical multinational firms with headquarters in country F:
country H: country F:
HQS
PP:
• production: only v1
• exports: v1, imports: v2
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
PP:
• production: only v2
• exports: v2, imports: v1
• assembly: 
v1 & v2 → variety of X
• sales of output:
domestic market & exports
Note: HQS ≡ headquarter services; PP ≡ production plant
Figure 1: allocation of production activities across countries
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Figure 2: summary of comparative steady state results
all relevant shocks
TABLES 
 
Table 1: Basic regression results 
Independent Variable Random effects Fixed effects Random effects 
Common AR(1) term 
in errors. 
Constant 0.165*** 
(0.014) 
0.197*** 
(0.011) 
0.166*** 
(0.011) 
Foreign Investment 0.104*** 
(0.014) 
0.090*** 
(0.002) 
0.089*** 
(0.010) 
Year_2000 -0.013 
(0.017) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.014) 
Year_2001 0.010 
(0.017) 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
Year_2002 -0.028* 
(0.017) 
-0.029 
(0.019) 
-0.028* 
(0.019) 
Year_2003 -0.039** 
(0.017) 
-0.040** 
(0.018) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
Year_2004 -0.071*** 
(0.014) 
-0.072*** 
(0.018) 
-0.071*** 
(0.020) 
Year_2005 -0.064*** 
(0.014) 
-0.066*** 
(0.013) 
-0.064*** 
(0.020) 
# obs. 294 294 294 
Notes: The dependent variable is total domestic capital expenditures of U.S. multinational firms in a 
sector divided by total value added of the multinational firms in the sector. Foreign investment is 
defined as foreign capital expenditures of U.S. multinational firms in a sector divided by total value 
added of the multinational firms in the sector. Standard errors that correct for clustering appear in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Regression results for non-manufacturing and manufacturing sectors with 
interaction effects. 
 Non-Manufacturing Manufacturing 
Constant 0.183*** 
(0.025) 
0.166*** 
(0.019) 
0.157*** 
(0.013) 
0.158*** 
(0.013) 
Foreign Investment 0.104*** 
(0.013) 
0.112 
(0.176) 
-0.140 
(0.096) 
-0.214** 
(0.108) 
Foreign Investment * 
Centralized Labor 
Share ( 22 ϕϕ − ) 
 -0.192 
(0.268) 
 -0.892* 
(0.502) 
Foreign Investment * 
Centralized Share 
Intermediate ( αα − ) 
 0.380 
(0.556) 
 0.291** 
(0.131) 
# obs. 154 140 140 136 
Notes: The dependent variable is total domestic capital expenditures of U.S. multinational firms in a 
sector divided by total value added of the multinational firms in the sector. Foreign investment is 
defined as foreign capital expenditures of U.S. multinational firms in a sector divided by total value 
added of the multinational firms in the sector. Standard errors that correct for clustering appear in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Sectors with 
NAICS codes 5231 and 5232-5239 are dropped due to missing observations for labor share.  
Table A1: Industries in the panel  
NAICS 
2002 
code 
Industry Manufacturing 
(1=Yes) 
Average wage 
in affiliates  
Affiliate wages / 
Domestic wages 
Exports to affiliates / 
Value added of 
affiliates 
11 Agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 0 $8,500 0.31 0.233 
211 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 $49,000 0.47 0.008 
212 Other mining 0 $32,800 0.45 0.094 
23 Construction 0 $37,800 0.63 0.462 
311 Food 1 $26,500 0.61 0.134 
324 Petroleum and coal products 1 $62,300 0.77 0.019 
3251 Basic chemicals 1 $43,900 0.58 0.318 
3252 Resins and synthetic rubber, fibers, and filaments 1 $52,300 0.66 0.552 
3254 Pharmaceuticals and medicines 1 $45,700 0.50 0.136 
3256 Soap, cleaning compounds, and toilet 
preparations 
1 $28,700 0.45 0.145 
3259 Other Chemicals 1 $46,800 0.68 0.594 
331 Primary metals 1 $31,200 0.53 0.140 
332 Fabricated metal products 1 $29,900 0.62 0.278 
3331 Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery 1 $37,200 0.52 0.537 
3332 Industrial machinery 1 $45,100 0.75 0.388 
3339 Other machinery 1 $35,200 0.67 0.328 
3341 Computers and peripheral equipment 1 $26,700 0.35 0.416 
3342 Communications equipment 1 $32,400 0.40 0.781 
3343 Audio and video equipment 1 $14,400 0.21 NA 
3344 Semiconductors and other electronic components 1 $20,000 0.29 0.621 
3345 Navigational, measuring, and other instruments 1 $43,800 0.65 0.462 
335 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 1 $19,800 0.43 0.302 
3361-
3363 
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 1 $34,900 0.53 1.113 
3364-
3369 
Other Transportation equipment 1 $26,500 0.56 0.602 
42 Wholesale trade 0 $50,700 0.87 0.470 
44-45 Retail trade 0 $15,100 0.70 0.186 
48-49 Transportation and warehousing 0 $30,400 0.53 0.025 
51 Information 0 $39,100 0.67 0.000 
5231 Securities, commodity contracts, and other 
intermediation and related activities 
0 $180,400 1.22 0.001 
5232-
5239 
Other finance, except depository institutions 0 $45,200 0.57 0.000 
524 Insurance carriers and related activities 0 $48,700 0.71 0.000 
531 Real estate 0 $31,600 0.51 0.000 
532 Rental and leasing (except real estate) 0 $38,100 0.96 0.011 
5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services 0 $53,400 0.82 0.000 
5415 Computer systems design and related services 0 $64,500 0.77 0.077 
5416 Management, scientific, and technical consulting 0 $94,100 1.02 0.000 
5419 Other Professional, Technical and Scientific 
Services 
0 $33,300 0.59 0.009 
56 Administration, support, and waste management 0 $22,600 0.87 0.004 
62 Health care and social assistance 0 $25,400 0.62 0.035 
721 Accommodation 0 $21,100 0.99 0.000 
722 Food services and drinking places 0 $11,100 0.63 0.011 
81 Miscellaneous services 0 $24,200 1.06 0.099 
Note: Numbers relate to the median over the years 1999-2005. Average wage in affiliates is calculated as the total compensation of employees in the affiliates divided by the 
total employment in the affiliates. Affiliate wages / Domestic wages is calculated as the average wage in affiliates divided by the average wage at the parent firm in the U.S. 
Exports to affiliates / Value added of affiliates is calculated as the value of U.S. exports shipped from U.S. parents to foreign affiliates divided by the value added of the 
foreign affiliates. Correlation between Manufacturing and Average wage in affiliates is -0.15. Correlation between Manufacturing and Affiliate wages / domestic wages is -
0.44. Correlation between Manufacturing and Exports to affiliates / Value added is 0.64 
 
 Table A2: descriptive statistics of variables 
  Whole Sample 
(N=294) 
Manufacturing 
(N=140) 
Non-
manufacturing 
(N=154) 
Variable Description Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Domestic 
Investment 
Domestic capital 
expenditures / Value 
added of US parent 
companies 
0.18 0.14 0.15 0.07 0.20 0.18 
Foreign 
Investment 
Foreign capital 
expenditures / Value 
added of US parent 
companies 
0.10 0.43 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.58 
Share 
Intermediate  
Exports shipped by 
U.S. parents to foreign 
affiliates / Value 
added of foreign 
affiliates 
0.26 0.29 0.43 0.29 0.09 0.15 
Labor share Compensation of 
employees of foreign 
affiliates / Value 
added of foreign 
affiliates 
0.53 0.20 0.50 0.15 0.56 0.23 
 
